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PARTISANSHIP IN THE CONTENT AND READERSHIP OF BRITISH NEWSPAPERS: POST-WAR TRENDS

Abstract: Have the British national dailies become less or more partisan in the post-war period? Using endorsement data and survey data, this article finds that partisanship as reflected in content, and partisanship as reflected in party preferences of the readers followed different trajectories: there was an overall decline in the former, and a slight increase in the latter. Dailies started to use a less partisan language in their coverage at the same time that their readerships grew more partisan and less reflective of the general electorate. The article concludes by offering a number of possible explanations to account for this counter-intuitive result.

Key words: press partisanship, political parallelism, British newspapers, endorsement, readership

The term “press-party parallelism” was first used by Colin Seymour Ure (1974) to describe the partisan affiliations of British newspapers, and later gained much prominence when Hallin and Mancini (2004) used it as one of their four major variables to describe media systems,¹ after which it became the focus of a number of empirical studies in various contexts.² Yet, we still lack a detailed historical account of the development of political parallelism in the UK. The pioneering two-volume study by Stephen Koss (1981, 1984) was published in early 1980s -leaving three decades to be covered- and although there is a lively scholarly discussion about the post-war trends, reviewed below, there seems to be a dearth of empirical studies paying individual attention to the different aspects of press partisanship (as reflected in content, readership, and organizational ties).³ There is a big discussion as to the content aspect (mostly based on casual observations), a strong consensus that organizational ties are no longer, and little discussion of the trends in the readership aspect.

In what follows, I first review the literature on trends in political parallelism in the post-war period, and then present recent-historical data on press partisanship as it is reflected in the content and readership of the national dailies, using election-eve endorsements and data on the party preferences among readers of individual newspapers.⁴

I. The Debate

The literature on post-war trends in content parallelism in the British press revolves around two main points of controversy. The first is whether there is a uniform post-war trend (from more to less parallelism), or a number of ups and downs. The second is whether the immediate post-war period is part of the larger consensus era or a distinct period deserving separate treatment.

The major sides to the first controversy are Stephen Koss with his two volume study on political parallelism in the British press (1981, 1984), and James Curran and Jean Seaton with their influential book *Power Without Responsibility* (1997), which includes a chapter on British press history. Koss argues that “By 1947, the party attachments of papers [...] were effectively abandoned. [...] newspapers grew steadily more catholic and less partisan in their ordinary news coverage”.⁵ Curran and Seaton confront this argument head on, which they see being “echoed by many other accounts of the post-war press”⁶, and draw a more complicated picture with ups and downs, not a single

trend. They argue that the power of the interventionist press barons, which is a factor making newspapers more partisan, continued in the immediate post-war years, waned in the 60s and early 70s, and then was “re-asserted” from mid 70s onwards. Together with the general political environment of the country, the degree of proprietor control, according to Curran and Seaton, explains the degree of partisanship of newspapers as well. In 1960s and 70s, “The devolution of authority within newspaper organizations, at a time of broad political consensus, encouraged a more bipartisan approach to political reporting and commentary”⁷. Increased partisanship from 1974 onwards, on the other hand, coincided with “the re-assertion of hierarchical control” in 1970s⁸.

Anthony Weymouth “echoes” Koss by describing a single trend when he argues for “progressive depoliticisation of the national press since 1945” (1996:42); and Seymour-Ure (1991), Tunstall (1996), and Deacon et al. (2001) draw complicated pictures with ups and downs, siding with Curran and Seaton (1997).

The second point of controversy, or more accurately point of difference, is among the latter group who see multiple trends in the post-war period: some of the authors see the immediate post-war years are part of the consensus era, whereas others think that they constitute a distinct period deserving separate treatment. Tunstall (1995) and Curran and Seaton (1997) adopt the latter view, treating the immediate post war years as a distinct period, whereas Seymour-Ure (1991) and Deacon et al. (2001) adopt the former view, treating these years as part of a larger period spanning the three decades until 1970s. Seymour-Ure argues that “For 30 years after the war the trend was away from full-blooded party bias”⁹. Similarly, Deacon et al. (2001) see the period until 70s as one of decreasing political parallelism in the press. On the other side of this controversy, Tunstall argues that the immediate post-war period, from 1945 to 55, needs to be treated separately from “the two decades from the arrival of Macmillan in 1957 to the departure of Harold Wilson as Prime Minister in 1976”¹⁰ during which press partisanship was comparatively lower than immediate post-war years. Similarly, to Curran and Seaton, the immediate post-war period is different from 60s and early 70s, in that the latter was characterized by “a more bipartisan approach to political reporting and commentary”¹¹.

II. Endorsement Data

Because newspapers in the UK have a tradition of endorsing the party or parties they support in upcoming elections, it is a relatively

straightforward matter to prepare tables showing which daily supported which party in which election, and a number of such tables have already been prepared. Despite the seemingly straightforward nature of the task, however, there are differences between tables of endorsement prepared by different sources. For example, the endorsement of The Times in 1964 elections was coded as Conservative by Seymour-Ure (1991), and as Conservative/Liberal by Butler and Butler (2000). The discrepancy occurs because the newspapers do not declare their positions by blue or red flags, or even in single sentences, but in (sometimes lengthy) articles that explain the details and the rationale behind their position, which, at times, may be difficult to simplify in Labor vs. Conservative (vs. Liberal/Liberal Democrat) terms, and open to different interpretations when coding.

In what follows, I have combined endorsement data from different sources (see Appendix 1), with the following rule: If there was a discrepancy in the positions assigned by the researchers (as is the case for the position of the Times in 1964 elections), I chose the one that assigned a more complex/ambiguous position over the other. In the example above, I selected Butler and Butler's (2000) coding over Seymour-Ure's (1991).


A measure of parallelism was devised for each election using the endorsement data, as the ratio of the number of papers that endorsed a single party in that election to the number of all titles in publication at the time. By this measure, papers that did not endorse a single party, either by avoiding any endorsements or by expressing support for multiple parties, were considered to constitute the non-parallel part of the press.

Aggregating measures for individual elections, we get figures for entire periods under study, which allows us to take sides in the controversies reviewed above. Table 2 lists the political parallelism measures for each period, based upon the endorsement data reported in Appendix 1, and Figure 1 graphs these figures.

Table 1. Post-War Trends in Content Parallelism in the UK

	Period I	Period II	Period III	Period IV
Quality	0,78	0,44	0,65	0,55
Mid Market	1,00	0,93	0,92	0,75
Popular	1,00	0,93	0,83	0,83
All titles	0,93	0,77	0,80	0,71

Figure 1. Post-War Trends in Content Parallelism in the UK



Two points deserve mention when we examine Table 1 and Figure 1. The first is that although there does seem to be a trend from more to less parallelism when we compare the overall figures for the first period (0.93) with the most recent final period (0.71), the trend is not a uniform one; there are ups and downs. The second point is that the ups and downs in the overall figures result mostly from the behavior of the quality papers, not the mid-market or popular papers which conform to the picture of a uniform declining trend. It seems to be the case that the quality papers, which follow politics more closely, are more likely to take tactical positions in line with the changes in the political environment; whereas mid-market and popular papers, as a whole, follow a different logic: they grew increasingly less partisan over time. As to the first controversy in the literature, then, there seems to be evidence to support both sides, with the proviso that they apply to different segments of the newspaper market: Higher levels of parallelism and uniform declining trend in the mid-market and popular segments, lower levels of parallelism and ups and downs in the quality segment.

As to the second controversy, the evidence is more conclusive: the data support the authors that treat the immediate post-war separately from the following consensus period, especially with regard to the quality papers. There is a dramatic decline from 0.78 to 0.44 from Period I (immediate post war years, 1945-55) to Period II (consensus era, 1955-1974) in the political parallelism of the quality papers. Mid-market and popular papers also display less parallelism in the second period compared to the first, although the differences are not quite as dramatic (from 1.00 to 0.93 for both segments).

III. Readership Parallelism

Availability of historical survey data going back to 1960s enables us to examine the readership aspect of political parallelism in the British press in more detail. In what follows, I use British Election Studies Survey Data from 1964 to 2005 to develop a measure of readership parallelism, an intuitive and easy to interpret measure based on the different vote shares of political parties among the readers of different newspapers. More specifically, I have calculated the difference between the vote shares of a party among the general electorate and among the readers of a specific newspaper, giving me a measure of how less or more popular that party was among the readers of this newspaper compared to the general electorate. For example, in 2005, the Conservative Party's vote share among the general electorate was 29 percent,¹² whereas among the Daily Telegraph readers, it was 71 %, a large difference of 42 percentage points (+42 Conservative). The extra 42 percentage points in favor of the Conservatives came from the difference in the votes for Labour (-30), the Liberal Democrats (-8), and the other parties (-4), who were underrepresented among the readers of the daily by these percentages. The sum of minuses (-42) or pluses (+42), then, is a measure of how much the make-up of the readership of a specific newspaper differs from that of the general electorate. For the Daily Telegraph in 2005, this 'difference' figure, on a scale from 0 to 1, was 0,42. For the mid-market Daily Express, which has also endorsed the Conservative Party in 2005, this figure was 0,18. (See Table 2 for 2005, and Appendix 2 for newspaper-level parallelism calculations in all elections from 1964 to 2010). Averaging the figures for all newspapers, we get a measure of overall parallelism in that election, which was 0,26 in 2005. Separate figures for individual segments can also be calculated, by averaging the figures for relevant papers: In 2005, parallelism in the quality segment was much higher (0,32) compared to parallelism in the mid-market (0,22) and popular (0,22) segments.

Table 2. Differences in Vote Choice between the Readers of Individual Newspapers and the General Electorate in 2005: A Measure of Readership Parallelism

	Endorsed	Cons.	Labour	Lib-Dem	Other	Parallelism (sum of pluses or minuses)	Parallelism in segments
Telegraph	Con	0,42	-0,30	-0,08	-0,04	0,42	Quality 0,32
Guardian	Lab, more lib	-0,28	0,24	0,09	-0,05	0,33	
Independent	More lib	-0,22	-0,01	0,27	-0,04	0,27	
Times	Lab, more cons	0,15	-0,20	0,10	-0,05	0,25	


Express	Con	0,19	-0,12	-0,04	-0,03	0,19	Mid-Market 0,22
Mail	No Lab	0,24	-0,18	-0,03	-0,03	0,24	
Sun	Lab	-0,04	0,09	-0,08	0,03	0,12	Popular 0,22
Mirror	Lab	-0,21	0,26	-0,07	0,03	0,29	
Star	Uncommitted	-0,07	-0,04	-0,14	0,25	0,25	
Average						0,26	

Table 3 displays segment and overall readership parallelism figures for all elections between 1964 and 2010,¹³ except for 1970 and 1979 elections, for which data are not available, and Figure 2 compares overall readership and content parallelisms in three periods.

Table 3. Readership Parallelism in the UK 1964-2010

	1964	1966	1970	1974	1974	avg	1979	1983	1987	1992	avg	1997	2001	2005	2010	avg
Quality	0,33	0,31	-	0,29	0,31	0,31	-	0,27	0,29	0,32	0,29	0,28	0,35	0,32	0,24	0,30
Mid-market	0,23	0,23	-	0,19	0,20	0,22	-	0,26	0,25	0,28	0,26	0,28	0,22	0,22	0,32	0,26
Popular	0,16	0,19	-	0,20	0,20	0,19	-	0,19	0,18	0,17	0,18	0,19	0,30	0,22	0,24	0,24
All	0,26	0,25	-	0,24	0,25	0,25	-	0,24	0,24	0,26	0,25	0,25	0,28	0,26	0,27	0,27

Figure 2. Post War Trends in Content and Readership Parallelism in the UK



Two points deserve emphasis upon examining the overall parallelism figures in Table 3 and Figure 2. The first is the continuity in the level of readership parallelism. The level of readership parallelism in individual elections varies within the rather narrow range of 24 to 28 percent, and when aggregated in periods, we get an almost linear line, from 25 in Periods II and III, to 27 in Period IV. In the same period, content parallelism has first risen from 77 to 80 percent, and then decreased from 80 to 71.

The second point is that compared to the levels of parallelism in content, which varied between 70 and 90 percent, readership parallelism figures not only move in a narrower range, but also are lower on the whole, in 20s. In other words, the percentage of papers that declare a political position in support of a single party on election eves is higher than the percentage of readers who follow their papers' endorsement. Even when newspapers come strongly in support of individual political parties, their readers do not completely or even predominantly vote for their paper's endorsed party. Looking at Table 2 and Appendix 2, we can see that large numbers of readers disagree with their paper on which party to support. In 2005, Daily Telegraph was the paper with the most loyal readership, with a parallelism figure of 0,42 but even this paper failed to persuade 30 percent of its readers who nevertheless voted Labour, Liberal Democrat, or other. To give another example from 2005, the tabloid Sun, the worst performer in 2005 in terms of having its readers vote for the endorsed party, had over 50 percent of its readers disagreeing with its choice to support the Labour. Put another way, many papers retain rather heterogeneous audiences despite the partisan stances they take on election eves.


Taken together, what these two points imply is that conclusions based on readership data about press-party parallelism in a country do not necessarily reflect neither the level, nor, more significantly, the movement of parallelism in content. It is possible to have low levels of readership parallelism despite high levels of content parallelism, and to have figures for readership and content parallelism moving in opposite directions. These are important points to consider when theorizing about the different dimensions of press-party parallelism.

These points, based upon the comparison of *overall* levels of readership and content parallelism, however, need to be qualified by the breakdown of the British national daily market into the three segments of quality, mid-market, and popular papers. We have seen, in the earlier section on content parallelism, that quality papers behave quite differently from the mid-market and popular papers in their levels and trends of endorsement: There were ups and downs in their levels of partisanship, whereas content parallelism in the mid-market and popular papers were in steady decline. One wonders whether the same is true about the behavior of their readerships too.

When we look at Figure 3, which shows the breakdown of the readership parallelism in the post-war period to quality, mid-market, and popular segments, we see that the make-up of the three segments differ from each other both in the levels and the trends of readership parallelism. Readership parallelism in the quality segment is higher, and remains more or less the same throughout the period. That is to

say, over-representation (or under-representation) of political parties among the readers of the quality have not changed much, it remained at about 30 percent. In the mid-market and the popular segments, on the other hand, which have lower levels of readership parallelism, there seems to be a move towards more parallelism over time. That is to say, individual mid-market and popular titles started to over- or under-represent voters of different political parties; in other words, their readership is less representative of the general electorate today than was the case in 1960s. We may term this phenomenon the politicization of the mid-market and tabloid readerships. This politicization has occurred earlier in the mid-market segment, in the third period, and later in the popular segment, in the most recent fourth period.

Figure 3. Post-War Trends in Readership Parallelism in the UK



What makes this politicization of the readerships even more interesting is the fact that this has occurred at a time of overall decline in content parallelism of the mid-market and popular papers (Figure 1). Looking at Figures 1 and 3 together, we can observe the politicization of the readerships of mid-market and popular segments at a time of de-politicization in the contents of newspapers in these two segments. The quality segment behaves differently, however, in that its content parallelism fluctuates without an overall trend, and its readership parallelism remains constant.

The opposite movements of readership (up) and content (down) parallelism in the mid-market and popular segments, however, do have a common logic: In both cases, they are movements in the direction of the quality papers. The quality segment has the lowest levels of content parallelism, and the highest levels of readership parallelism. By

decreasing their content parallelism (Figure 1) and by increasing their readership parallelism (Figure 4), the mid-market and the popular papers are becoming “qualitized”.

Qualitization in this sense means having lower levels of content parallelism and at the same time higher levels of readership parallelism. For one reason or another, the quality papers attract more homogeneous (partisan) audiences, although their endorsements are less partisan and more nuanced. The mid-market and popular papers on the other hand, used to attract readers right across the political spectrum, with a balanced distribution of voters of different political parties, resembling the general electorate, despite the fact that their endorsements were more partisan, less nuanced, and more in favor of a single political party. Now, they also seem to be adopting the quality papers’ strategy of having more nuanced/neutral political positions, and their readerships seem to be becoming more homogenized despite the less partisan stances taken.

This is contrary to what we would expect. If newspapers sell not only news but also opinions, and people buy newspapers that contain the opinions they like, the opposite should be the case: Newspapers should attract more homogenous audiences as they take more partisan stances, and more heterogeneous audiences as they take more nuanced positions catering to voters of different parties. One question that arises from the evaluation of the trends in readership and content parallelism, then, is this: How come low levels of content parallelism are coupled with high levels of readership parallelism, and vice versa?

The second question that arises from the analysis of trends is, why are the mid-market and popular newspapers becoming more like the quality papers both in terms of the political make-up of their readerships, and the type of endorsements they make?

A possible answer to the first question may be the following: Readers of the quality papers, following politics more closely, may be expecting their papers to adopt refined, well-thought out, and detailed positions regarding political parties on election eves, which makes it harder to endorse a single party and introduces “if”s and “but”s and strategic calculations to the analysis. This may explain the lower levels of content parallelism among the quality papers compared to the other two segments, who generally endorse single parties with few, if any, reservations. Why is this coupled with a skewed distribution of voters that is different from the general electorate? Again, this may have to do with the more politically oriented readership of the quality papers, who may be placing more emphasis when choosing their papers on its political standing, no matter how nuanced that standing is. For the readers of the mid-market and popular papers, on the other hand,

political standing may not be that important when choosing which paper to read, compared to other criteria like the quality of the scoops, the price of the paper, or even the pictures, which may explain the relatively non-differentiated make up of the readership of the popular papers from the general electorate despite the strong endorsements made.

To be able to answer the second question of why the mid-market and popular papers are becoming qualitized in terms of political content and political make up of their readerships, we need to know about other accompanying trends that may be of relevance. For example, if the readerships of the mid-market and quality papers are becoming more similar to the readerships of the quality papers in other respects as well (not just in political orientation), this may provide a starting level explanation. Have the readership of the mid-market and popular papers become more upper class over the years? Or, have newspaper prices gone up in the mid-market and popular segments, thus affecting on the make-up of their readerships? Was there a society-wide increase in interest in national politics, thus changing the demands of the readers from a popular newspaper (more politics in the mix?) and encouraging the managements of these papers to adopt more politically nuanced positions? Or, have the popular newspapers come to be owned by moguls less interested in shaping the politics and more in expanding their businesses, thus having their managements avoid single-party endorsements, and spreading their bets? Did revenues from copy sales decrease, thus forcing the popular and mid-market papers to rely more heavily on revenues from advertising (like the quality papers do), and to try to form a readership fit to such a strategy? Finding satisfactory answers to all of these questions are beyond the confines of this study, and I will leave it at that, as further points of inquiry, being content with pointing to the phenomenon of qualitization.

Notes:

¹ The other three are the development of a mass printing press, professionalism and the role of the state.

² Van Kempen examines media-party parallelism and its effects on voter participation in the EU countries using cross-sectional data (2007) and in Sweden from a historical perspective (2006). Bayram (2010) examines political parallelism in Turkey from a historical perspective, and Çarkoğlu and Yavuz (2010) examine press-party parallelism in Turkey using survey data. Popescu and Toka (2007) examine the impact of press party parallelism, among others, on the making of informed choices by voters in the EU countries.

³ These are the three dimensions defined by Seymour-Ure (1974), who refers to the content aspect as “goal unity”.

⁴ The data and the discussion throughout the article are organized into four periods: 1- Immediate post-war (1945-1955) 2- Consensus era (1955-1979) 3- Conservative governments (1979-1997) 4- Labour governments (1997-2010).

⁵ Koss cited in Curran, James, and Jean Seaton, *Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain* (5th. New York and London: Routledge, 1997), 71.

⁶ Curran, James, and Jean Seaton. *Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain*, 71.

⁷ Curran, James, and Jean Seaton. *Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain*, 84.

⁸ Curran, James, and Jean Seaton. *Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain*, 77.

⁹ Seymour-Ure, Colin, *The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945* (1st. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1991), 198.

¹⁰ Tunstall, Jeremy, *Newspaper Power: The New National Press in Britain* (1st. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 240.

¹¹ Curran, James, and Jean Seaton. *Power Without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain*, 77.

¹² Conservative Party's real vote share turned out to be 32.4 percent in the 2005 elections. However, I use not the actual vote distribution, but the vote distribution among the sample used by the British Election Studies, whose success in predicting the actual results vary over the elections. I used figures from the sample rather than actual election results so that the differential success of the surveys in different elections does not distort the calculation of parallelism. If the study sampled less Conservatives than there actually was, then this is expected to be reflected to the same degree in the distribution of votes among the readers of individual newspapers as well, thus not affecting the calculation of differences.

¹³ The figures for 2010 are based on the BES CSES Internet Survey data.

Appendix 1. Newspaper Endorsements in the UK General Elections 1945-2010

		1945	1950	1951	1955	1959	1964	1966	1970	1974	1974_2	
1-5	Quality	Daily Telegraph	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	
		The Times	None	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con/Lib	More Lib	Con/Lib	Con/Lib	Con/Lib
		(Manchester) Guardian	Lib	Lib	Lib/Con	Lib/Con	Lab/lib	Lab	Lab/Lib	Lab/Lib	Con/Lab/Lib balance	More Lib influence
		Financial Times	-	-	-	-	-	Qualified Con	Uncommitted	Uncommitted	Con	Con/Lib
		Independent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6-10	Mid-market	Daily Express	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	
		Daily Mail	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con/Lib coalition
		Daily Herald/Sun	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	-	-	-
		News Chronicle	Lib	Lib	Lib	Lib	Lib	-	-	-	-	-
		Today	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11-14	Popular	Daily Mirror	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	
		Daily Sketch/Graphic	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	-	
		Sun	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Lab	Con	Coalition
		Daily Star	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

		1979	1983	1987	1992	1997	2001	2005	2010	
1-5	Quality	Daily Telegraph	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	
		The Times	-	Con	Con	Con	Euro Sceptic	Lab	Lab, more cons	Con
		(Manchester) Guardian	Lab/Lib	Not Con landslide	Lab	Lab more Lib Dems	Lab/Lib	Lab/Lib	Lab, more lib dems	Lib
		Financial Times	Con	Con	Con	Not Con majority	Lab	Lab	Lab	Con
		Independent	-	-	Uncommitted	Uncommitted	Lab/Lib	Uncommitted	More lib dems	Lab/Lib
6-10	Mid-market	Daily Express	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	Lab	Con	Con
		Daily Mail	Con	Con	Con	Con	Con	No Labour landslide	No Lab victory	Con
		Daily Herald/Sun	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		News Chronicle	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Today	-	-	Coalition	Con	-	-	-	-
11-14	Popular	Daily Mirror	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	Lab	
		Daily Sketch/Graphic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Sun	Con	Con	Con	Con	Lab	Lab	Lab	Con
		Daily Star	Uncommitted	Con	Con	Uncommitted	Lab	Lab	Uncommitted	Uncommitted

Note: Based upon Seymour-Ure (2001) and Butler & Butler (2000, 2006) for 1945-1997; Boothroyd (n.d.) for 1964-97; Deacon & Wring (2002) for 2001; Brandenburg (2006), Scammell & Harrop (2005), and BBC (2009) for 2005; Stoddard (2010) for 2001-2010, Greenslade (2010) for 2010. Whenever there was a conflict between endorsement data from different sources, the one that assigned a more complex position was selected ('Lab, more lib dems' over 'Lab'). Grey cells represent positions that are more complex than simply endorsing a single political party.

Appendix 2. Readership Parallelism in UK Parliamentary Elections 1964-2010,
Newspaper Level

	1964					1966					Feb 1974					Oct 1974					1983				
	Cons	Lab	Lib	Oth	sum	Cons	Lab	Lib	Oth	sum	Cons	Lab	Lib	Oth	sum	Cons	Lab	Lib	Oth	sum	Cons	Lab	Lib	Oth	sum
Telegraph	0,40	-0,37	-0,04	0,00	0,40	0,41	-0,36	-0,04	-0,01	0,41	0,34	-0,32	-0,01	-0,02	0,34	0,37	-0,30	-0,04	-0,03	0,37	0,29	-0,24	-0,05	0,00	0,29
Guardian	-0,22	-0,05	0,28	0,00	0,28	-0,18	0,02	0,16	-0,01	0,18	-0,24	0,00	0,26	-0,02	0,27	-0,21	0,05	0,17	-0,01	0,23	-0,31	0,09	0,22	0,00	0,31
Independent																									
Times					0,29					0,29	0,14	-0,26	0,11	0,01	0,26	0,26	-0,33	0,06	0,01	0,33	0,14	-0,19	0,06	-0,01	0,20
Express	0,15	-0,10	-0,05	0,00	0,15	0,13	-0,10	-0,02	-0,01	0,13	0,19	-0,12	-0,06	0,00	0,19	0,20	-0,16	-0,04	0,01	0,20	0,25	-0,18	-0,06	-0,01	0,25
Mail	0,15	-0,16	0,01	0,00	0,16	0,14	-0,17	0,04	-0,01	0,17	0,20	-0,15	-0,03	-0,02	0,20	0,20	-0,16	0,00	-0,04	0,20	0,28	-0,20	-0,06	-0,01	0,28
Today																									
Sun	-0,31	0,37	-0,08	0,02	0,39	-0,38	0,38	-0,02	0,02	0,40	-0,20	0,19	0,02	-0,01	0,20	-0,15	0,18	-0,03	-0,01	0,18	0,00	0,08	-0,08	-0,01	0,09
Mirror	-0,16	0,16	0,00	0,00	0,16	-0,19	0,19	0,00	-0,01	0,19	-0,19	0,19	-0,01	0,00	0,20	-0,18	0,20	0,01	-0,03	0,21	-0,23	0,21	0,01	0,01	0,23
Daily Star																					-0,24	0,27	-0,02	0,00	0,27
Total	0,01	-0,14	0,13	0,00	0,26	-0,07	-0,04	0,12	-0,01	0,25	0,24	-0,47	0,28	-0,05	0,24	0,48	-0,52	0,13	-0,09	0,25	0,18	-0,16	0,03	-0,05	0,24
	1987					1992					1997					2001					2010				
	Cons	Lab	Lib	Oth	sum	Cons	Lab	Lib	Oth	sum	Cons	Lab	Lib	Oth	sum	Cons	Lab	Lib	Oth	sum	Cons	Lab	Lib	Oth	sum
Telegraph	0,32	-0,26	-0,06	-0,01	0,32	0,38	-0,27	-0,04	-0,07	0,38	0,38	-0,29	-0,06	-0,02	0,38	0,57	-0,42	-0,06	-0,09	0,57	0,41	-0,22	-0,16	-0,03	0,41
Guardian	-0,34	0,32	0,02	-0,01	0,34	-0,32	0,16	0,18	-0,03	0,34	-0,26	0,18	0,11	-0,03	0,30	-0,25	0,12	0,22	-0,09	0,34	-0,29	0,05	0,19	0,04	0,29
Independent	-0,06	-0,12	0,19	-0,01	0,19	-0,04	-0,11	0,20	-0,06	0,20	-0,19	-0,02	0,23	-0,03	0,23					0,20	-0,14	0,01	0,17	-0,04	0,18
Times	0,25	-0,29	0,06	-0,01	0,31	0,35	-0,23	-0,09	-0,02	0,35	0,15	-0,17	0,07	-0,06	0,22	0,25	-0,23	-0,01	0,00	0,25	0,03	-0,02	0,06	-0,07	0,09
Express	0,27	-0,20	-0,06	-0,01	0,27	0,30	-0,21	-0,06	-0,02	0,30	0,34	-0,28	-0,05	-0,02	0,34	0,08	-0,24	0,15	0,01	0,24	0,32	-0,24	-0,17	0,08	0,40
Mail	0,24	-0,22	0,00	-0,01	0,24	0,34	-0,25	-0,04	-0,06	0,34	0,22	-0,19	-0,01	-0,02	0,22	0,20	-0,12	-0,04	-0,04	0,20	0,19	-0,12	-0,11	0,05	0,24
Today	0,01	-0,22	0,22	-0,01	0,23	-0,02	-0,11	0,20	-0,07	0,20															
Sun	0,06	-0,03	-0,02	-0,01	0,06	0,03	0,01	-0,01	-0,03	0,04	0,00	0,06	-0,04	-0,02	0,06	-0,07	0,11	-0,02	-0,02	0,11	0,09	-0,02	-0,03	-0,03	0,09
Mirror	-0,29	0,31	-0,03	0,00	0,31	-0,28	0,28	-0,07	0,06	0,35	-0,20	0,27	-0,09	0,03	0,30	-0,19	0,36	-0,15	-0,02	0,36	-0,32	0,50	-0,16	-0,02	0,50
Daily Star	-0,11	0,17	-0,04	-0,01	0,17	-0,09	0,13	-0,02	-0,02	0,13	-0,12	0,18	-0,09	0,03	0,21					0,23					0,23
Total	0,35	-0,54	0,30	-0,11	0,24	0,64	-0,58	0,25	-0,31	0,26	0,32	-0,25	0,06	-0,13	0,25	0,58	-0,44	0,10	-0,25	0,28	0,28	-0,06	-0,20	-0,02	0,27

Notes: Based on British Election Study data. For 2010, the BES-CSES Internet Survey Data were used. For 1970 and 1979 elections, no data are available. Figures for 2005 are given in Table 4. If less than 20 readers of a newspaper were sampled, the calculations for that paper were not included in the table. This is the reason why Financial Times is not included in the table at all, and Times, Independent, and Daily Star in some years. For these years, shaded gray, period averages were used to avoid distorting the sums.

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